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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Does “because of sex” include “because of transsexualism”?  Such a simple 
question, but such a complicated answer.  The answer is so complicated that federal 
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courts have been unable to find even one cut and dried way to analyze the issue.  
Instead, the cases directly on point have resulted in at least three doctrinal 
approaches to resolving the question.1  The first approach is what this author calls the 
“congressional intent” analysis.2  The next approach is what this author calls the “sex 
stereotyping” analysis.3  Lastly, there is the “plain meaning” analysis.4  Not only are 
courts inconsistent in how they analyze these cases, but courts are also inconsistent 
in reaching conclusions under certain consistent approaches.5  The purpose of this 
Article is two-fold.  First, this Article will discuss whether transsexuals should be 
protected at all from employment discrimination, and if so, whether protection 
should be accomplished through legislative or judicial means.  Then, the Article will 
discuss each of the aforementioned approaches and advocate for a logical and 
consistent manner in which courts should decide cases under Title VII where a 
transsexual plaintiff alleges discrimination because of sex. 
Part I discusses both the factual and legal distinctions between “transsexuals,” 
“transgendered,” and “inter-sexed” individuals.   Part II discusses various legislative 
approaches to protection of transsexuals and other transgendered individuals.  Part 
III discusses the ramifications of holding that Title VII protects transsexuals from 
employment discrimination and concludes that federal law should protect 
transsexuals from employment discrimination.  Part IV discusses the “congressional 
intent” approach and concludes that courts should abandon the use of this approach 
in the context of deciding whether Title VII protects transsexuals.  Part V discusses 
the “sex stereotyping” approach and concludes that this approach is not well-suited 
for deciding whether transsexuals are members of a “protected class” under Title 
VII.  Part VI discusses the “plain meaning” approach and concludes that this 
approach is the most appropriate way to resolve whether Title VII protects 
transsexuals.  The conclusion advocates for the use of the “plain meaning” approach 
in analyzing cases involving transsexuals.  
II.  WHO ARE TRANSSEXUALS AND HOW DO THEY DIFFER FROM OTHER 
TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS? 
No federal court has espoused a legal definition of the word “transsexual” in 
anything but dicta.6  The medical profession defines transsexuals as individuals who 
“[experience] great discomfort regarding their actual anatomic gender” and “who are 
committed to altering their physical appearance through cosmetics, hormones, and, 
                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Ulane v. E. 
Airlines, Inc. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 
(D.D.C. 2006). 
2 See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081. 
3 See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d 729. 
4 See, e.g., Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203. 
5 Compare id., at 212 (holding that transsexuals are protected by Title VII under a “plain 
meaning” analysis), with Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that transsexuals are not protected by Title VII under a “plain meaning” analysis). 
6 See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3 (defining “transsexualism” as “a condition that 
exists when a physiologically normal person . . . experiences discomfort or discontent about 
nature’s choice of his or her particular sex and prefers to be the other sex”). 
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in some cases, surgery.”7  Transsexuals do not identify themselves as being members 
of the sex that they were assigned at birth,8 whereas transvestites are content with the 
sex they were assigned at birth, but dress as people of the opposite sex for sexual 
arousal.9  One study, however, reveals that the distinction between transsexuals and 
transvestites is not so clear.10  The study notes that, “trans people have complex 
gender identities, often moving from one ‘trans’ category into another over time.”11  
The term “transgendered” is used as an umbrella term to describe anybody whose 
dress and/or behavior can be interpreted as transgressing gender roles.12  This 
includes transsexuals, transvestites, and other categories of people whose dress 
and/or behavior do not conform to gender roles.13   
Intersexed individuals, on the other hand, are not necessarily transgendered 
people.  Intersexed individuals are a category of people whose sex at birth is 
ambiguous for one of two reasons: (1) the sexual organ can be classified as either an 
abnormally small penis or a large clitoris;14 or (2) they are chromosomally of one sex 
but they develop genetalia of the opposite sex because of a genetic mutation.15  
Intersexed individuals may also have gender identity issues, thereby making them 
transgendered as well.16  However, the two categories are separate and distinct.17  
This Article will not further discuss issues involving intersexed individuals. 
Interestingly, the medical profession uses the term “transsexualism” as an 
informal synonym for “gender identity disorder” or GID.18  The standard medical 
procedure for treating GID is referred to as “triadic therapy,” and it consists of: (1) 
                                                                 
7 WebMD, Gender Identity Disorder, http://www.webmd.com/sex/gender-identity-
disorder (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).   
8 See id. 
9 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3. 
10 See STEPHEN WHITTLE, LEWIS TURNER & MARYAM AL-ALAMI, EQUALITIES REVIEW, 
ENGENDERED PENALTIES: TRANSGENDERED AND TRANSSEXUAL PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES OF 
INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 14 (2007), http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/Engendered 
Penalties.pdf.  
11 Id. 
12 See Richard Ekins & Dave King, Blending Genders: Contributions to the Emerging 
Field of Transgender Studies, 1 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 1, 1 (1997), available at  
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0101.htm.  
13 See id. 
14 See Jennifer Rellis, “Please Write ‘E’ in This Box” Toward Self-Identification and 
Recognition of a Third Gender: Approaches in the United States and India, 14 MICH. J 
GENDER & L. 223, 226 (2008). 
15 See id.; see also, NAT’L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, INC., REPORT: ANDROGEN 
INSENSITIVITY SYNDROME, PARTIAL (2005), available at http://www.webmd.com/sexual-
conditions/androgen-insensitivity-syndrome-partial. 
16 See Rellis, supra note 14, at 226-27.  
17 See id. 
18 See The Harry Benjamin Int’l Gender Dysphoria Ass’n, Standards of Care for Gender 
Identity Disorders, (6th ed. 2001) at 2, http://www.wpath.org/Documents2/socv6.pdf.     
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real-life experience living as a person of the self-identified sex; (2) hormone therapy; 
and (3) surgery to change genitalia and other sex characteristics.19  This protocol of 
medical treatment for transsexuals is malleable, however, and according to the 
medical profession, not all people with GID “need or want all three elements of 
triadic therapy.”20   
In order to state a claim as a “transsexual” under Title VII, courts seem to require 
more than a mere diagnosis of “gender identity disorder.”21  In fact, in every reported 
Title VII case involving a transsexual plaintiff, the plaintiff not only had GID, but 
also underwent (or sought to undergo) sex reassignment surgery.22  Also, in many 
cases, the court required substantial medical evidence regarding GID.23 
III.  LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF TRANSSEXUALS AND OTHER 
TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS 
Numerous states, counties, and municipalities have enacted legislation that either 
explicitly declares that employment discrimination on the basis of “gender identity” 
is forbidden,24 or that protects transsexuals and other transgendered individuals under 
a prohibition of discrimination because of “sex”25 or because of “sexual 
orientation.”26  Other state law protected classes that include transsexuals are 
“gender,” “transgender status,” and “affectional preference.”27  All in all, thirteen 
states, the District of Columbia, and 108 localities have enacted legislation explicitly 
protecting transsexuals and other transgendered individuals from employment 
                                                                 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 (D.D.C. 2006) (requiring the 
plaintiff to develop a more thorough factual record that “reflects the scientific basis of sexual 
identity in general, and gender dysphoria in particular”).  For an argument that legal 
protections of transgender people are too narrow because courts tend only to protect plaintiffs 
who have had or seek to have sex reassignment surgery and, even in such cases, make it 
overly burdensome for the plaintiff to prove a case by requiring a plethora of medical 
evidence, see Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and 
Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 253, 271-73 (2005).    
22 See, e.g., Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 213. 
23 See, e.g., id. 
24 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7(A) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(I) (2007); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-5-12(a) (West 2007). 
25 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(p) (West 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.56(c) 
(West 2009). 
26 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.08(2) (2007); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-103(O-1) 
(2008). 
27 For a complete list of all the states, counties, and municipalities that have legislation 
explicitly protecting transsexuals from employment discrimination and other forms of 
discrimination, see Transgender Law and Policy Ins., Scope of Explicitly Transgender-
Inclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact 
_sheets/TI_antidisc_laws_7_08.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).  
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discrimination.28  Still other states, counties, and municipalities have enacted 
legislation or executive orders that protect transsexuals and other transgendered 
individuals who are public employees from employment discrimination.29  
What explains this trend towards legislative protection of transsexuals and other 
transgendered individuals from employment discrimination?  The answer lies in the 
rationale behind anti-discrimination laws in general.  The goal of employment 
discrimination law in general is to achieve equal employment opportunities for 
everybody.30  The law seeks to have employment decisions based solely on merit 
(i.e., the quality of an individual’s work performance), rather than on immutable 
characteristics such as race, skin color, sex, disability, age, etcetera.31  Some of the 
criticism surrounding the protection of transsexuals from workplace discrimination is 
based on an unfortunately common misconception that transsexualism is a choice 
and therefore not an immutable characteristic deserving protected class status.32  
However, various medical studies “suggest that [transsexualism] may be caused by 
genetic (chromosomal) abnormalities, hormone imbalances during fetal and 
childhood development, defects in normal human bonding and child rearing, or a 
combination of these factors,”33 meaning that transsexualism is immutable.34  After 
all, why would anybody voluntarily subject themselves to all the negative 
consequences that transsexuals often face, such as high unemployment, low wages, 
homelessness, lack of health care, and criminal victimization?35 
IV.  SO WHAT IF TRANSSEXUALS ARE PROTECTED UNDER TITLE VII? 
Generally, Title VII represents a legislative compromise between the sometimes 
adverse interests of employers and employees.36  This section seeks to compile the 
                                                                 
28 See id. at 4. 
29 See id. at 5. 
30 See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal 
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (2007). 
31 See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8, 13, 19-20 (2000). 
32 For example, in a conversation I had with a fellow student about this article, the student 
argued that transgendered people do not deserve protection from employment discrimination 
because one chooses to be transgendered. 
33 WebMD, supra note 7.  
34 See Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don’t 
Want You to Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 150 (1998). 
35 For statistical data regarding income, health insurance, housing, employment, and abuse 
rates for transgendered people, see S.F. Dep’t of Pub. Health, The Transgender Community 
Health Project (1999), available at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfact 
sheet.pdf. 
36 See generally, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (referring to a 
“balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives”), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; McDaniel v. Essex Int’l, Inc., 
571 F.2d 338, 344 (6th Cir. 1978) (“In enacting section 701(j) Congress explicitly required a 
balancing between the religious needs of the individual and the legitimate business needs of an 
employer.”). 
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available empirical data regarding unemployment rates of, wage rates of, 
discrimination rates against, and harassment rates against transsexuals and other 
transgendered people (representing the interests of employees), along with economic 
studies regarding workplace efficiency (representing the interests of employers), and 
balance the pros and cons of holding that transsexuals are protected under Title VII.  
While the author concludes that it is in the best interests of society to protect 
transsexuals under federal law, the author urges the reader to reach his or her own 
conclusions based on the information available. 
This section also addresses whether a legislative or judicial approach is better 
suited to protect transsexuals from employment discrimination.  The author 
concludes that a legislative approach is most appropriate, but any protection will do.  
Lastly, this section discusses the more difficult question of whether anti-
discrimination law can adequately protect the interests of transsexuals.  The author’s 
conclusion on this point is skeptical, but hopeful.   
Transsexual employees merely seek equal employment opportunities and equal 
protection under the law.37  Yet, the available evidence shows a lack of equality for 
transsexuals in the workplace.  About one in every 18,000 to one in every 30,000 
people are male to female (MTF) transsexuals.38  About one in every 54,000 to one 
in every 100,000 people are female to male (FTM) transsexuals.39  Not much 
empirical work has been done in the area of employment of transsexuals; however, 
“available studies provide strong evidence that ‘harassment and other forms of 
discrimination in the workplace, from recruitment to promotion, is endemic when it 
comes to transsexual people.’”40  In one survey, 37% of transsexuals said that they 
had been demoted or fired for being transsexual.41  Another study found a 42% 
unemployment rate for transsexuals.42  In 1999, the median monthly income for 
transsexuals in San Francisco was $744 for MTF transsexuals and $1,100 for FTM 
transsexuals.43  In the United Kingdom, where transsexuals are protected from 
employment discrimination, 22% of transsexuals, after completing sex reassignment 
surgery, reported that their employers forced them to use the bathroom for people of 
their sex assigned at birth.44  Thrity-eight percent of transsexuals in the United 
Kingdom reported experiencing harassment at work near the time of sex 
reassignment surgery, while 6% of transsexuals reported physical abuse at work.45  
                                                                 
37 See generally, Vade, supra note 21.  
38 See JSI Research and Training Inst., Inc., Access to Health Care for Transgendered 
Persons in Greater Boston, at 3 (2000), available at http://www.glbthealth.org/ 
documents/transaccessstudy.pdf. 
39 See id. 
40 See WHITTLE, TURNER & AL-ALAMI, supra note 10, at 22 (quoting Stephen Whittle, 
Employment Discrimination and Transsexual People, (2000), http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/ 
Employment.Discrimination_and_Transsexual_People.pdf). 
41 See id. at 23. 
42 See id. 
43 See S.F. Dep’t of Pub. Health, supra note 35.  
44 See WHITTLE, TURNER & AL-ALAMI, supra note 10, at 35.  
45 Id. at 23. 
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Most alarmingly, one study concludes that “[t]he overall socio-economic 
discrimination experienced by trans people, as a result of poor pay, job loss or low 
income support has been strongly linked with experiencing a transgender-related 
violent incident.”46  Therefore, protecting transsexuals from employment 
discrimination may not only decrease unemployment and workplace harassment, but 
may also reduce the incidence of hate crimes. 
Employers, on the other hand, are mainly interested in making money.47  Most 
employers, especially those in highly competitive markets, seek to increase profits 
either through cutting costs, increasing revenues, or a combination of the two.  As for 
cutting costs, many law and economics scholars argue that employment decisions are 
structured so as to reduce or eliminate transaction costs.48  These scholars conclude 
that transaction costs are reduced, and many employers operate most efficiently, 
through homogeneity in the workforce.49  In fact, scholar Richard Epstein, argues 
that “part of the problem with antidiscrimination law is that it compromises 
workplace efficiency by preventing employers from establishing homogeneous 
workplace cultures.”50  Other scholars contend that “[n]either antidiscrimination law 
nor the affirmative pursuit of diversity operates as a meaningful barrier to, or 
substantially undermines the incentives for employers to achieve, workplace 
homogeneity,”51 because employers can achieve a diverse, yet homogenous, 
workforce by employing only those minority group members who have assimilated 
into the mainstream of society.52   
In the case of transsexuals and other transgendered people, assimilation is nearly 
impossible because of strong American cultural barriers to assimilation.53  If 
transsexuals cannot assimilate, then they will be more likely to disrupt workplace 
homogeneity, and thus will reduce workplace efficiency.54  Perhaps the best example 
supporting the proposition that transsexuals cannot assimilate is the phenomenon of 
“transphobia.”  Transphobia is the widespread belief that one’s doctor-assigned sex 
at birth is one’s true sex and that transgendered people are “frauds against truth, or 
people who deceive others,” because their self-identified sex does not conform to the 
                                                                 
46 Id. 
47 See The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility, ECONOMIST, Jan. 
22, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3555212. 
48 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1788 
(2003) (reviewing FRANCISO VALDES, JEROME MCCRISTAL CULP & ANGELA P. HARRIS, 
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)) (“Cumulatively, this 
body of work advances a standard economic argument about transaction costs: Employment 
decisions will be structured to reduce them.”). 
49 See id. at 1789-90, 1793. 
50 Id. at 1790. 
51 Id. at 1791. 
52 See generally id. at 1793 (describing assimilation as “palatability”).  
53 See Rellis, supra note 14, at 224.  
54 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 48, at 1789-93. 
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doctor-assigned “truth.”55  Nowhere does transphobia manifest itself in the 
workplace more than in cases involving a dilemma over which bathroom the 
transsexual may use.56  Indeed, numerous employers have legitimate concerns that 
workplace productivity and employee morale will suffer because of a controversy 
over what bathroom transsexuals use.57  Therefore, protection of transsexuals and 
other transgendered people from employment discrimination may be bad for the 
economy. 
If transsexuals are protected by Title VII, then the employer may be caught in a 
“catch 22,” having to choose whether to allow a transsexual to potentially disrupt the 
productivity and morale of co-workers by using a certain bathroom, or whether to 
discharge the transsexual employee and risk a lawsuit.  However, the cases on point 
unanimously hold that employers are not liable under Title VII for firing a pre-
operation transsexual for using the “wrong” bathroom.58  Moreover, it is conceivable 
that an employer may avoid liability in such a case through the application of a bona-
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense.59  Although the BFOQ defense is 
very narrow,60 at least one court has held that an employer successfully asserted a 
BFOQ defense in a case against a female janitor where the job entailed cleaning 
mens bathrooms.61  Therefore, it seems logical to extend this defense to employers 
who require transsexuals who have yet to officially undergo sexual reassignment 
surgery to use the bathroom of the sex assigned at birth.    
The benefits of a reduction in unemployment, workplace harassment, and the 
incidence of hate crimes far outweigh the increased transaction costs and reduced 
workforce efficiency that may result from protecting transsexuals from employment 
discrimination.  As one venerable attorney once told me, “Slavery is good for the 
economy!”62  But that does not justify its legal sanctioning.  Additionally, since 
transsexuals comprise a relatively minute percentage of the overall population,63 the 
potential aggregate economic impact of protecting transsexuals from employment 
discrimination should be negligible.  More importantly, one need only look at the 
                                                                 
55 See Vade, supra note 21, at 287-88.    
56 See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnson 
v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 
57 See Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (referring to “allegations . . . that Plaintiff had been 
using both the men’s and women’s restrooms at the meat-packing plant”). 
58 See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219, 1228; Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998, 1000. 
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise . . . .”). 
60 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
61 See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
62 This statement was made, in sarcastic criticism of arguments that certain laws are bad 
for the economy, by Jeff Boyd, member of the Ohio Association for Justice. 
63 JSI Research and Training Inst., Inc., supra note 38, at 3. 
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sometimes horrific facts of hate crime cases involving transsexuals to realize that the 
law should protect such individuals from discrimination.64 
So, what is the best means (i.e., legislative or judicial) to protect transsexuals and 
other transgendered people from employment discrimination?  Federal legislation is 
the most appropriate way to protect transsexuals and other transgendered people 
from employment discrimination.  This conclusion is based on a combination of 
factors such as: (1) the likelihood that Congress will pass legislation protecting 
transsexuals from employment discrimination compared to the likelihood that the 
Supreme Court will hold that Title VII protects transsexuals; (2) the fact that 
legislative protection of transsexuals would be broader and more inclusive of 
transgendered people who are not transsexuals than judicial protection under Title 
VII; and (3) the unique problems presented by transsexuals in the workplace that 
may arise, such as health insurance coverage of sexual reassignment surgery, which 
make legislative protection particularly appropriate. 
As far as the likelihood that Congress will pass legislation protecting transsexuals 
from employment discrimination goes, it probably will not happen anytime soon.  
Perhaps the best chance transsexuals have for federal legislative protection from 
employment discrimination is inclusion in the proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).65  ENDA, as it was originally drafted, would have 
protected gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual (GLBT) people from discrimination 
in employment.66  However, before the House of Representatives voted on the bill, 
provisions for “gender identity and expression” were removed from the language of 
the bill out of concerns that “including transgender workers in the legislation would 
cause it to fail in the full House.”67  The bill, in its amended form, passed through the 
House by a vote of 235 to 184.68  Some of the Democratic supporters of the bill in 
the House of Representatives voted against it because it did not include protections 
for transsexuals.69  Some Republicans also argued that transsexuals should be 
included in the legislation, presumably so that the bill would fail.70  Within forty-
eight hours of the House’s removal of language that would protect transsexuals from 
the bill, GLBT activists united and started a grassroots campaign to pass only the 
original version of the bill.71  Most Democratic leaders, however, believe that passing 
                                                                 
64 See generally Vade, supra note 21, at 256, 290 n.7 (discussing the beating, 
asphyxiation, and murder of a transsexual named Gwen Araujo). 
65 See Shannon Price Minter, Banding Together, ADVOCATE.COM Oct. 17, 2007, 
http://advocate.com/exclusive_detail_ektid49796.asp (discussing Representative Tammy 
Baldwin’s belief that there are sufficient congressional supporters of transsexuals’ rights to 
pass a bill that would include a ban on discrimination because of gender identity). 
66 See id. 
67 See Jesse J. Holland, Bill to Protect GLB Workers Advances Without the T, 
ADVOCATE.COM Oct. 19, 2007, http://advocate.com/news_detail_ektid49855.asp. 
68 See David M. Herszenhorn, House Approves Broad Protections for Gay Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, A1. 
69 Holland, supra note 67. 
70 See Herszenhorn, supra note 68. 
71 See Minter, supra note 65. 
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a bill that protects only gay, lesbian, and bisexuals from employment discrimination 
“‘will lay the foundation for passing [a bill that would protect transsexuals] in the 
future.’”72  Comments such as this, along with the growing trend of enacting 
legislation in states and localities around the country, give transsexuals some hope 
that one day Congress will protect them from employment discrimination.  As of 
September 2009, the current status of the bill includes language that would protect 
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.73  However, 
considering that some members of Congress have been trying to pass legislation that 
would protect homosexuals from employment discrimination for the past thirty-three 
years74 and have still failed to do so, it appears that legislative protection of more 
politically controversial groups, such as transsexuals and other transgendered people, 
may not happen for many years to come. 
With the current composition of the Supreme Court, it seems more likely that the 
Court will protect transsexuals under Title VII than that Congress will do so.  The 
deciding vote would be that of Justice Kennedy, since the rest of the Court is split, 
with four generally conservative members (Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and Roberts) and 
four generally liberal members (Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor).  In 
Lawrence v. Texas, a 2003 case holding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize 
homosexuality, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion.75  Although holding that 
Title VII protects transsexuals has very little to do with holding that it is 
unconstitutional to criminalize homosexuality, the Lawrence opinion, at a bare 
minimum, shows that Justice Kennedy is somewhat sympathetic to the plight of 
gays, and presumably, to that of transsexuals as well.  This means that the best shot 
transsexuals have for federal protection from employment discrimination is through 
judicial means.  However, it is still a long shot given the fact that Justice Kennedy 
also joined in the majority opinion of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, holding that, to 
the extent that a New Jersey law prohibited the Boy Scouts from discriminating 
against homosexuals in their membership, the law was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment freedom of association.76    
Legislative protection of transsexuals would likely be broader and more inclusive 
of other transgendered people than judicial protection under Title VII.  While Title 
VII certainly can be interpreted as protecting transsexuals from employment 
discrimination,77 it would be improper for a court to make “transsexual” into a 
separate and independent protected class under Title VII without a legislative 
amendment to the statute.78  Therefore, in all cases under Title VII involving 
transsexuals, the proper inquiry would still be whether the plaintiff was 
discriminated against because of sex.  As such, it would remain a question of fact for 
                                                                 
72 See Holland, supra note 67 (quoting California Democrat George Miller). 
73 See HRC, Employment Non-Discrimination Act, http://www.hrc.org/laws_and 
_elections/enda.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
74 See Herszenhorn, supra note 68. 
75 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
76 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000). 
77 See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
78 See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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the jury to determine whether the transsexual plaintiff in any given case was 
discriminated against because of sex.79  The jury would have to decide whether the 
employer discriminated against the transsexual plaintiff because the plaintiff changed 
from one sex to another sex (presumably making it discrimination because of sex) or 
whether the employer discriminated against the transsexual plaintiff because of some 
other reason, such as disruption of the workforce.80  In the usual case, the real 
discrimination lies in the inconsistent perceptions between the employer, society, and 
the transsexual employee.81  Most employers view MTF transsexuals as men, while 
the MTF transsexual views herself as a woman, even if no sexual reassignment 
surgery has been undertaken.82  Generally, employers find this difference in 
perception of the employee’s sex to be troubling, not the employee’s sex per se.83  
The difference in perception is troubling because it may disrupt the workforce by 
interfering with workplace homogeneity.84  Employment discrimination law focuses 
on the subjective intent of the employer.85  Employers may not discriminate “because 
of sex.”86  But Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of incompatible 
perceptions that may cause a disruption in the workforce.87  This means that absent 
any direct evidence of discrimination because of sex (e.g., a statement by the 
employer that the plaintiff was fired because he was a man who wanted to become a 
woman), the transsexual plaintiff would find it very difficult to prove a case under 
Title VII’s burden shifting approach.88   
On the other hand, through a broad prohibition against discrimination because of 
“gender identity or expression,” legislation could address the fine distinction 
between discrimination because of transsexualism and discrimination because of 
incompatible perceptions, so that an employer could no longer hide behind the 
                                                                 
79 See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin, 
J., dissenting).  
80 Id. (“[The plaintiff] says she was fired for having become female under controversial 
circumstances.  The employer says these circumstances are disconcerting to other employees . 
. . Plaintiff says that how she became female is not her employer’s business . . . . Those are 
questions [for a trier of fact].”). 
81 See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661 n.1 (noting that the typical controversy over 
transsexualism stems from a difference in perception between society’s view of the 
transsexual’s sex and the transsexual’s own view of his or her sex). 
82 See generally Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661 n.1. 
83 See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
85 See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3rd Cir. 2002) 
(“‘Discriminat[ion]’ refers to the practice of making a decision based on a certain criterion, 
and therefore focuses on the decisionmaker’s subjective intent.”) (brackets in original). 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
87 See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-64; Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 
1219 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (N.D. Ohio 
2003). 
88 See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-64; Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219; Johnson, 337 F. 
Supp. 2d at 998. 
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argument that the employee was not fired because of transsexualism, but rather 
because of the effect or potential effect that the employee’s transsexualism may have 
on the workforce.  Legislation could also extend protection to other transgendered 
people, not just transsexuals.  Therefore, it would be better for Congress to enact 
legislation specifically protecting transsexuals and other transgendered people from 
employment discrimination because such legislation would be broader and more 
inclusive than judicial protection under Title VII. 
In addition, the legislature is better suited than the court to make important policy 
decisions that are peculiar to protection of transsexuals from employment 
discrimination.  For instance, who is a “transsexual”?  Courts that protect 
transsexuals under Title VII view transsexualism as a question of fact,89 meaning that 
plaintiffs often must pay for medical evidence and expert testimony about the 
plaintiff’s transsexualism in order to state a claim.90  If Congress were to provide a 
definition of the term, or better yet, if Congress were merely to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression,” then, presumably, 
plaintiffs would not be chilled from bringing suit because of overly burdensome 
evidentiary requirements.91  In addition, such legislation may help to prevent 
transvestites and other transgendered people from attempting to pigeon-hole their 
way into the category of “transsexual” so that they may bring suit under Title VII 
according to case law that currently protects transsexuals but not other transgendered 
people.   
Moreover, legislation is the most appropriate way to address the issue of 
employer health insurance coverage for sexual reassignment surgery.  If Title VII 
protects transsexuals, then would it be discrimination because of sex for an employer 
to refuse to cover sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy under its insurance 
plan?92  Would it matter whether the employer’s insurance covers procedures such as 
mastectomies and hormone therapy for non-transsexual employees where those 
procedures are medically necessary?93  If Title VII protects transsexuals, then these 
are issues that will inevitably have to be litigated, potentially resulting in different 
outcomes in different jurisdictions.  These collateral issues are matters of policy that 
Congress is well suited to decide.  This is just one more reason why it is more 
appropriate to protect transsexuals through legislative means. 
Before moving on to the next section, it is important to address whether 
protecting transsexuals from employment discrimination will accomplish the goal of 
                                                                 
89 See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211-212 (D.D.C. 2006). 
90 See Vade, supra note 21, at 271-273.    
91 See id. 
92 In Davidson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1979), the court held that sex reassignment surgery for transsexuals is a medically 
necessary procedure, and the court refused to exclude the procedure from coverage under the 
employer’s health insurance plan.  
93 See Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
transsexual employee’s claim under Title VII failed where the employer denied medical 
insurance coverage of procedures involving the employee’s treatment of gender dysphoria 
where the employee presented no evidence that the insurance plan covered procedures such as 
mastectomies for non-transsexual employees). 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/9
2009] TOWARD A PLAIN MEANING APPROACH 657 
providing equal employment opportunities to transsexuals.  Scholars writing on this 
topic tend to overlook “big picture” questions such as this.  But the question merits 
serious consideration.  Anytime judges or lawmakers contemplate expanding the law 
into previously uncharted waters, it is important to consider whether a change in the 
law will actually serve to change behavior.   
Unfortunately, there is scant empirical data from the United States that addresses 
the effectiveness of laws that protect transsexuals from employment discrimination.  
This is likely because transsexualism is rare,94 and it is difficult to compile 
statistically significant data when the sample size is so small.  However, one study 
from England revealed some rather disappointing results.95  The study concluded that 
“despite the recent legislation regarding transsexual people in employment, 
employers are either failing to prevent inequality and discrimination for trans 
employees, or [transsexuals] lack faith in their employer’s ability to . . . comply with 
employment protection legislation.”96  Nevertheless, transsexuals should be afforded 
protection from employment discrimination.  Change does not happen overnight; it 
was roughly one hundred years after the slaves were freed before the Supreme Court 
finally banned racial segregation.  The author remains optimistic that federal 
protection of transsexuals from employment discrimination will one day achieve its 
goal of providing equal employment opportunities. 
V.  DOING AWAY WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT APPROACH IN ANALYZING 
WHETHER TITLE VII PROTECTS TRANSSEXUALS 
Before the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,97 federal 
appellate courts unanimously held that Title VII did not protect transsexuals from 
discrimination because of transsexualism.  In a series of opinions in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the Seventh,98 Eighth,99 and Ninth100 Circuits all held that when 
enacting Title VII, Congress intended only to protect women who were 
discriminated against because they were women and men who were discriminated 
against because they were men; nothing more.101  This part details these three 
opinions and concludes that the “congressional intent” approach to analyzing the 
issue of whether Title VII protects transsexuals is inappropriate, particularly in light 
of the utter lack of legislative history to support the conclusion that Congress did not 
intend for Title VII to protect transsexuals from employment discrimination.102 
                                                                 
94 WebMD, supra note 7. 
95 See WHITTLE, TURNER & AL-ALAMI, supra note 10, at 33-40. 
96 Id. at 33. 
97 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
98 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984). 
99 Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
100 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977). 
101 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663-63. 
102 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
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A.  Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to decide 
whether Title VII protects transsexuals from employment discrimination.  In 
Holloway, the MTF plaintiff’s employment was terminated shortly after she 
informed her supervisor that she was undergoing treatment in preparation for sex 
reassignment surgery.103  The plaintiff claimed that “she was fired for having become 
female under controversial circumstances,” in violation of Title VII.104  The district 
court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.105  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.106  With little explanation or reasoning, the court concluded 
that when enacting Title VII, “Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in 
mind.”107  The court also noted that despite the “dearth” of legislative history 
surrounding the original enactment of Title VII, the legislative history surrounding 
subsequent amendments to the act evinced a congressional intent “to remedy the 
economic deprivation of women as a class.”108  In a desperate attempt to further 
support its conclusion, the court noted that subsequent attempts by Congress to 
amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination because of “sexual preference” had 
failed.109  The court failed to explain how the subsequent amendments and attempted 
amendments were relevant to determining Congress’s intent in 1964, when Title VII 
was originally enacted. 
Judge Goodwin, in his dissent, made the following persuasive comments:  
It seems to me irrelevant under Title VII whether the plaintiff was born 
female or was born ambiguous and chose to become female.  The relevant 
fact is that she was, on the day she was fired, a purported female.  She 
says she was fired for having become female under controversial 
circumstances.  The employer says these circumstances are disconcerting 
to other employees.  That may or may not be true.  Plaintiff says that how 
she became female is not her employer’s business.  That may or may not 
be true.  Those are questions that ought to be answered in court, in a trial; 
they should not be precluded by summary judgment or Rule 12 
dismissal.110 
As is always the case, where the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to cast 
doubt upon any legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons that the employer may have 
advanced for an adverse employment action, discrimination is a question of fact for 
the trier of fact to decide.111  The only logical way to preclude a case with facts such 
                                                                 
103 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661. 
104 See id. at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 661 (majority opinion). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 662. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting). 
111 See id. (majority opinion). 
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as Halloway from going to trial would be to conclude that Congress intended to 
exclude transsexuals from protection under Title VII.  However, there simply is no 
factual support for such a conclusion.  
B.  Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. 
In 1982, the Eighth Circuit became the second federal appellate court to decide 
whether Title VII protects transsexuals.112  In Sommers, the pre-operative MTF 
transsexual plaintiff was fired from her job two days after being hired “because she 
misrepresented herself as an anatomical female when she applied for the job,” and 
such “misrepresentation led to a disruption of the company’s work routine in that a 
number of female employees indicated they would quit if Sommers were permitted 
to use the restroom facilities assigned to female personnel.”113  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim.114  On 
appeal, the court affirmed.115  The Eighth Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause Congress 
has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based 
on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of [Title VII].”116  
The court in Sommers also noted the congressional attempts and failures to amend 
Title VII to prohibit discrimination because of “sexual preference.”117  Confusingly, 
the court noted that, “Sommers’s claim is not one dealing with discrimination on the 
basis of sexual preference,” but then went on to say, “[n]evertheless, the fact that the 
proposals were defeated indicates that the word ‘sex’ in Title VII is to be given its 
traditional definition, rather than an expansive interpretation.”118  As in Holloway, 
the Eighth Circuit attempted to determine Congress’s intent in 1964 by interpreting 
subsequent congressional actions regarding a different protected class.119   
C.  Ulane v. Eastern Airlines (Ulane II) 
Until recently, the leading case in the realm of Title VII protection for 
transsexuals was the Seventh Circuit’s 1984 opinion in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines 
(Ulane II).  In Ulane I, the district court held that “the statutory word ‘sex’ literally 
and scientifically applies to transsexuals even if it does not apply to homosexuals or 
transvestites.”120 Ulane I ordered reinstatement, back pay, and attorney’s fees to the 
MTF transsexual plaintiff.121  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in Ulane II, held that 
Title VII does not protect transsexuals because “Congress never considered nor 
                                                                 
112 See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
113 Id. at 748-49. 
114 Id. at 749. 
115 Id. at 750. 
116 Id. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
120 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984). 
121 Id. at 1082. 
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intended that [Title VII] apply to anything other than the traditional concept of 
sex.”122  Ulane II was in accord with the two other federal courts of appeals that had 
decided the issue at the time: the Ninth Circuit;123 and the Eighth Circuit.124   
Ulane II’s reasoning is hardly persuasive.  Ulane II starts with the premise that 
the court must “interpret this congressional legislation and determine what Congress 
intended when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.”125  Next, the court 
notes that “‘[s]ex as a basis of discrimination was added as a floor amendment one 
day before the House approved Title VII, without prior hearing or debate.’”126  From 
this “total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment,”127 the court 
somehow concludes that Congress intended to exclude transsexuals from protection 
under Title VII.128   
Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane II represent the problem with using a 
congressional intent approach to analyze whether Title VII protects transsexuals: the 
court must create something out of nothing.  The sex amendment was originally 
proposed in order to defeat Title VII from passing in the House vote.129  That is it—
the only reason why Title VII now prohibits discrimination because of sex is because 
a Congressman hoped that by adding “sex” as a protected class, the legislation would 
fail.  But, obviously, the statute passed with the term “sex” included.  So, what did 
Congress mean by “sex” when it passed the statute?  Ulane II concludes from “the 
circumstances of the amendment’s adoption” a “clear[] indicat[ion]” that Congress 
did not intend to protect transsexuals.130  But the “circumstances of the amendment’s 
adoption” are anything but “clear.”  If anything, the addition of the word “sex” 
shows that Congress in 1964 was willing to prohibit a broader range of 
discrimination than some of the individual Congressmen believed Congress would 
be willing to prohibit at the time. 
Other jurists argue that Congress’s explicit exclusion of transsexuals from 
protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act is 
evidence that Congress did not intend Title VII to protect transsexuals from 
employment discrimination.131  One law review note even opined that the fact that 
“Congress lumped transsexuality with pedophilia, exhibitionism, and voyeurism in 
both disability acts” is “strong evidence that Congress was unsympathetic, and even 
hostile, to the plight of transsexuals.”132  However, even assuming, arguendo, that 
                                                                 
122 Id. at 1085. 
123 See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977). 
124 See Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750. 
125 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. 
126 Id. at 1085 (quoting Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662). 
127 Id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., James G. O’Keefe, Note, Pyrrhic Victory: Smith v. City of Salem and the 
Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1101, 1119 (2007). 
132 Id. 
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Congress was hostile to the plight of transsexuals when the Rehabilitation Act and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act were enacted, this bears little, if any, relevance 
on what Congress intended in 1964 when it enacted Title VII.133  Moreover, express 
exclusion of protection of transsexuals from employment discrimination in 
subsequent Acts of Congress evinces the exact opposite: that Title VII protects 
transsexuals.  Express exclusion from coverage under the disability statutes shows 
that Congress knew how to write legislation so that it would not be interpreted to 
protect classes of people that Congress did not intend to protect.  Therefore, 
Congress’s express exclusion of transsexuals in subsequent Acts, along with its 
failure to expressly exclude transsexuals from protection under Title VII, only 
supports the conclusion that transsexuals are protected by Title VII.134    
It is sometimes difficult to know exactly what one person means when he or she 
speaks, let alone an entire Congress.  This is not to say that congressional intent is 
never relevant or even that congressional intent is not a compelling tool to use in 
statutory interpretation.  However, where, as here, there is literally no legislative 
history to assist courts in their interpretation of the word “sex,” one cannot condone a 
court purporting to “interpret” Title VII by looking to congressional intent, when in 
fact what the court is doing is making assumptions about what Congress intended, 
with absolutely no factual or evidentiary basis.135   
Moreover, even if Congress did not contemplate that the phrase “because of sex” 
may be interpreted to include “because of transsexualism,” “Supreme Court 
decisions subsequent to Ulane . . . have applied Title VII in ways Congress could not 
have contemplated.”136  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,137 Justice 
Scalia noted, “[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [that 
statutes are enacted to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
                                                                 
133 See, e.g., Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 236 (1959) (noting that the intent of a later 
Congress in deciding when to declare an end to a war is not relevant in determining the intent 
of an earlier Congress in using the phrase “in time of peace”); See also In re Mfrs’ Nat’l Bank, 
16 F. Cas. 665, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1873) (No. 9051) (stating the rule of statutory construction that 
terms of a subsequent statute that do not expressly contradict the terms of a previous statute 
shall not be interpreted as intended to affect the terms of the previous statute). 
134 See generally Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 886 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that express exemptions of certain groups of people in subsequent statutory provisions 
showed that “when Congress intended to exempt certain groups of [people] from the sweep of 
the . . . statute, it knew how to do so,” and concluding that Congress’s failure to expressly 
exempt the group to which the plaintiff belonged showed that the plaintiff was not exempt). 
135 I believe that, in all likelihood, Congress did not intend for Title VII to protect 
transsexuals.  It just does not make sense.  Why would a politician care about a group of 
people that is politically powerless because they comprise such a small percentage of the 
population?  However, there is a discrete danger in basing decisions on mere speculation and 
probabilities.  The danger is that speculation may lead to both an inaccurate and unjust result.  
If the law is about justice, then speculation with no evidentiary or factual support is untenable.   
136 Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006). 
137 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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legislators by which we are governed.”138  Therefore, courts should not look to 
congressional intent in analyzing whether Title VII protects transsexuals. 
VI.  THE SEX STEREOTYPING THEORY IS AN INAPPROPRIATE METHOD OF 
DETERMINING WHETHER TITLE VII PROTECTS TRANSSEXUALS 
The recent trend in the federal appellate courts is to hold that Title VII protects 
transsexuals from employment discrimination under the “sex stereotyping” theory 
espoused in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.139  In fact, all three circuit courts to decide 
the issue after Price Waterhouse have either expressly held, or stated in dicta, that 
Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.140  The only circuit 
court to expressly hold that transsexuals are protected from employment 
discrimination under a sex stereotyping theory is the Sixth Circuit.141  The Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have stated in dicta that Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex 
stereotyping theory.142  This part will discuss the sex stereotyping theory of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the cases using this theory as a basis for holding that 
Title VII protects transsexuals.  The author concludes that the sex stereotyping 
theory, although perhaps applicable to how a transsexual plaintiff may prove 
causation in an employment discrimination case under Title VII, is not applicable to 
the threshold question of whether transsexuals are members of a protected class. 
A.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
In the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a 
majority of the Court agreed that a woman who was denied a promotion, in part 
because she was considered too “macho,”143 was discriminated against “because of 
sex.”144  Ms. Hopkins was a senior manager in a large accounting firm.145  She was 
ultimately denied partnership for many reasons, but some of the partners decided to 
vote against offering Ms. Hopkins partnership because she needed to “‘walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”146  Although the main issues in the case related to 
                                                                 
138 Id. at 79. 
139 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
140 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Etsitty v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 
1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000). 
141 See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith, 378 F.3d at 
575.  
142 See sources supra note 140. 
143 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
144 See id. at 250-51 (four Justice plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. 
at 272-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
145 Id. at 231. 
146 Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 
1985)). 
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causation147 and the burden of proof in a mixed-motives case148 under Title VII, there 
was also an issue of whether discrimination because of a failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes constituted discrimination “because of sex.”149  As to this latter issue, the 
Court stressed that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group.”150  Therefore, an employee is discriminated against “because of sex” 
where the employer makes an adverse employment decision because of that 
employee’s failure to act in a manner consistent with the employee’s sex.151 
B.  Schwenk v. Hartford 
Schwenk was the first case to apply the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory 
in the context of transsexuals.152  Schwenk involved an MTF transsexual’s claim 
against a prison guard under the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA).153  The 
Ninth Circuit read the relevant provisions of the GMVA as being analogous with 
Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of sex.154  The court then went 
on to say that  
The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been 
overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse.  In Price 
Waterhouse . . . the Supreme Court held that Title VII barred not just 
discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins was a woman, but also 
discrimination based on the fact that she failed “to act like a woman”—
that is, to conform to socially-constructed gender expectations.  What 
matters, for purposes of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that 
in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the 
victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that 
he believed that the victim was a man who “failed to act like” one.  Thus, 
under Price Waterhouse, “sex” under Title VII encompasses both sex—
that is, the biological differences between men and women—and gender.  
Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or 
woman is forbidden under Title VII. . . . [B]oth [Title VII and the GMVA] 
prohibit discrimination based on gender as well as sex.  Indeed, for 
                                                                 
147 See id. at 240-42. 
148 See id. at 245-46. 
149 See id. at 250-51 (noting that the parties did not overtly dispute whether discrimination 
because of non-conformity with stereotypes of a particular sex constitutes discrimination 
“because of sex,” but discussing the issue regardless).  
150 Id. at 251. 
151 Id. 
152 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000). 
153 See id. at 1192; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2006) declared unconstitutional by 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
154 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02. 
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purposes of these two acts, the terms “sex” and “gender” have become 
interchangeable.155 
Schwenk ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claim under the GMVA failed;156 
however, the dicta quoted above opened the door for other federal district and 
appellate courts to hold that Title VII protects transsexuals from employment 
discrimination.157  
C.  Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority 
In Etsitty, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to an employer who terminated an MTF transsexual employee for 
expressing an intention to use women’s restrooms before formally undergoing a sex 
change operation.158  This was certainly a peculiar disposition considering the fact 
that the employer had no evidence that the plaintiff had ever actually used a 
women’s restroom while at work.159 The court, however, held that firing an MTF 
transsexual employee for merely expressing an intention to use a women’s restroom 
while working constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action.160  In its analysis of whether Title VII protects transsexuals in 
the first instance, the court expressly rejected161 the plaintiff’s argument that 
“because a person’s identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs 
she possesses, discrimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of 
sex.”162  However, the court “assume[d], without deciding” that Title VII protects 
transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.163   
D.  Smith v. City of Salem 
In Smith, the Sixth Circuit became the first, and thus far, the only, federal circuit 
court to expressly hold that Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping 
theory.164  Relying on Schwenk and Price Waterhouse, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
transsexual plaintiff had stated a claim for relief under Title VII.165 Smith reasoned 
that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label such 
as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has 
                                                                 
155 Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
156 Id. at 1205.  
157 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004). 
158 See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224-26 (10th Cir. 2007). 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 1224-25. 
161 See id. at 1222. 
162 Id. at 1221. 
163 Id. at 1224. 
164 See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004). 
165 Id. at 573-75. 
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suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”166  The 
plaintiff in Smith was an MTF transsexual whose employer suspended her shortly 
after she informed her supervisor of her diagnosis with, and treatment for, Gender 
Identity Disorder.167  Notably, the court in Smith operated on the premise that 
transsexuals are, in fact, of the sex that they were assigned at birth.168  From this 
premise, it becomes rather obvious that a transsexual is the epitome of somebody 
who does not conform to the stereotypes associated with the group to which doctors 
assigned that individual upon birth.169  Therefore, discrimination against transsexuals 
is an easily recognizable form of sex stereotyping that constitutes impermissible 
discrimination under Title VII.170   
This all makes perfect sense if, and only if, one accepts the court’s premise that 
transsexuals are of the sex that they were assigned at birth.  This premise is arguably 
factually inaccurate,171 but more importantly, it is bad policy to regard transsexuals 
as members of the sex to which they were assigned at birth.172  As to the factual 
inaccuracy of this premise, “Medical literature recognizes that: Gender Identity 
Disorder . . . is not meant to describe a child’s nonconformity to stereotypic sex-role 
behavior as, for example, in ‘tomboyishness’ in girls or ‘sissyish’ behavior in boys.  
Rather, it represents a profound disturbance of the individual’s sense of identity with 
regard to maleness or femaleness.”173  In addition, transsexuals do conform to gender 
stereotypes;174 in fact, as part of the treatment for transsexualism, they are required to 
conform to gender stereotypes.175  In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff was a woman 
who identified as a woman, but whose behavior resembled that of a man.176  In the 
case of an MTF transsexual, you have a woman who identifies and acts like a 
woman,177 but whose body parts resemble those of a man. 
There are two policy problems with operating from the premise that transsexuals 
belong to the sex to which they were assigned at birth.  First, this sort of 
conceptualization feeds right into the mindset of a transphobic.  Remember that 
transphobia stems from a belief that transsexuals are deceptive and cannot be trusted 
                                                                 
166 Id. at 575. 
167 Id. at 568-69. 
168 See, e.g., id. at 572, 574 (referring to the plaintiff as “he” and referring to the plaintiff’s 
complaint as “his” complaint). 
169 See id. at 574. 
170 See id. at 574-75. 
171 See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (D.D.C. 2006). 
172 See generally, Vade, supra note 21, at 296-97.    
173 Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 564 (4th ed. 1994)). 
174 Id. at 211. 
175 See The Harry Benjamin Int’l Gender Dysphoria Ass’n, supra note 18, at 3. 
176 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
177 See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11. 
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because they do not identify with the doctor-declared “truth” that is their sex 
assigned at birth.178  Therefore, a court giving credence to this doctor-declared 
“truth” engages in a subtle form of communication, which allows transphobic people 
to carry on in their bigotry.   
Second, saying that transsexuals belong to the sex to which they were assigned at 
birth requires plaintiffs in a Title VII claim to plead, and admit that they belong to, 
that sex, even though they do not themselves believe that they belong to that sex.  
Such a pleading requirement may create collateral consequences for the transsexual 
plaintiff that the Sixth Circuit probably did not have in mind when it held that Title 
VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.  For example, say a pre-
operative MTF transsexual in Ohio is fired and files a suit under Title VII.  
According to Smith, the plaintiff must plead that she is a man, and that she was 
discriminated against for failing to conform to stereotypical masculine behavior.179  
Later in life, after the same person has undergone sexual reassignment surgery, she 
falls in love and seeks to marry to a man.  But wait!  There is public record where the 
same woman who now seeks to marry a man admitted that she was, indeed, a man.  
Will the marriage be valid?180  When the husband dies, will the wife be able to share 
in his estate?181  All of these potential collateral issues could be avoided if courts give 
credence to the plaintiff’s self-identified sex, rather than the doctor-assigned sex.   
Before moving on, the author would like to clear up any potential confusion in 
this discussion.  It is quite conceivable, maybe even likely, that an employer would 
view an MTF transsexual employee as a man, and then take an adverse employment 
action against that employee for failing to conform with the employer’s stereotypes 
about how men should act.  Since the employer’s subjective intent in deciding 
whether to make an adverse employment decision is what matters,182 it may seem 
difficult to understand how the sex stereotyping theory would not apply.  However, 
as a threshold matter, the plaintiff in a Title VII case must prove that he or she is a 
member of a protected class.183  It is in this context that the author argues that the sex 
stereotyping theory from Price Waterhouse should not apply.  An MTF transsexual 
plaintiff is a member of a protected class because she is a woman, despite what 
doctors, employers, and everybody else in society may think.  Even if one chooses to 
classify an MTF transsexual as a man, that individual would still be a member of a 
protected class under Title VII because Title VII protects everybody.184  If the 
employer fires her (the MTF plaintiff) for failing to be “manly,” then presumably, 
the sex stereotyping rule would enter its way into the analysis of whether the 
employer’s reason for making the adverse employment decision gives rise to liability 
                                                                 
178 See Vade, supra note 21, at 287-88. 
179 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. 
180 See OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (“Only a union between one man and one woman may 
be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.”). 
181 See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 121-22 (Kan. 2002). 
182 See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
183 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
184 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). 
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under Title VII.185  If the termination is, instead, for failure to look like a woman or 
for failure to be born with female genetalia, then presumably, there would still be 
discrimination “because of sex,” but the sex stereotyping rule would not apply in 
such cases.  The sex stereotyping rule is nothing more then one of the many ways in 
which a plaintiff can show that he or she was discriminated against “because of sex.”   
Price Waterhouse was not a case where Ms. Hopkin’s status as a member of a 
protected class was at issue.186  Yet, circuit courts often misapply the “logic and 
language” of Price Waterhouse in analyzing whether a transsexual plaintiff who 
brings a claim under Title VII is a member of a protected class.187  This 
misapplication of the sex stereotyping theory likely results from the history of the 
case law interpreting Title VII, which initially held that transsexuals are not members 
of a protected class because Congress did not intend to protect transsexuals when 
enacting Title VII.188  Indeed, it makes more sense to analyze Title VII protection of 
transsexuals under the “protected class” prong of the plaintiff’s prima facie case if 
using a congressional intent approach.  However, under a sex stereotyping approach, 
one must first assume that transsexuals are members of a protected class because the 
sex stereotyping rule only applies in analyzing whether the employer’s reason(s) for 
taking an adverse employment action constitute(s) discrimination “because of 
sex.”189  Price Waterhouse relates to proof of causation and has nothing to do with 
the separate issue of whether the plaintiff is a member of a protected class.190 
VII.  COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE WHETHER TITLE VII PROTECTS TRANSSEXUALS BY 
LOOKING TO THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE 
Statutory analysis both begins and ends with the plain meaning of the words that 
the Legislature has chosen to employ.191  In the context of Title VII, the statute 
prohibits discrimination in the “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment, because of . . . sex.”192  As noted before, given the total lack of 
legislative history regarding the meaning of the word “sex,”193 courts are left with 
nothing to analyze but the plain meaning of this seemingly simple and 
straightforward word.  Using such a plain meaning approach, courts have come to 
opposite conclusions as to whether “sex” also includes a “sex change.”  This part 
will discuss three cases in which the court used a plain meaning approach to 
determine whether Title VII protects transsexuals, and concludes that the word “sex” 
                                                                 
185 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
186 See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
187 See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th Cir. 2007). 
188 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).  
189 See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
190 Id. 
191 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed.”).  
192 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
193 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-85. 
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should be construed liberally to include discrimination against transsexuals because 
they are transsexuals. 
A.  Ulane v. Eastern Airlines (Ulane I) 
In Ulane I, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
held “that the term, ‘sex,’ as used in any scientific sense and as used in [Title VII] 
can be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the 
question of sexual identity and that, therefore, transsexuals are protected by Title 
VII.”194  The court explicitly refused to make any assumptions about what Congress 
intended when using the word “sex,” or to draw any conclusions from the scant 
legislative history on the addition of the word “sex” to the statute.195  The court’s 
reasoning was simple and straightforward; the MTF transsexual plaintiff was 
terminated from her employment because she had an operation whereby her male 
genitalia were medically converted into female genitalia,196 and termination for such 
a reason was “literally” discrimination because of sex.197   
B.  Schroer v. Billington 
In Schroer, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia revisited 
the decision in Ulane I and held that “discrimination against transsexuals because 
they are transsexuals is ‘literally’ discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”198  The court 
distinguished the line of cases applying the sex stereotyping theory from Price 
Waterhouse by noting that  
Schroer is not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits.  She 
seeks to express her female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a 
woman.  She does not wish to go against the gender grain, but with it.  
She has embraced the cultural mores dictating that “Diane” is a female 
name and that women wear feminine attire.  The problem she faces is not 
because she does not conform to the Library’s stereotypes about how men 
and women should look and behave—she adopts those norms.  Rather, her 
problems stem from the Library’s intolerance toward a person like her, 
whose gender identity does not match her anatomical sex.199 
Schroer is the only case to date which scratches beneath the surface of the post Price 
Waterhouse case law interpreting Title VII to come to the right conclusion.  
Moreover, Schroer is the only case to embrace the self-identification notion of sex 
and to operate from the premise that transsexuals belong to the sex with which they 
identify themselves.   
                                                                 
194 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
195 See id. 
196 See id. at 828-38. 
197 Id. at 825. 
198 Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006). 
199 Id. at 211-12. 
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C.  Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority 
In Etsitty, the plaintiff made two arguments in support of the finding that 
transsexuals were members of a protected class: the first argument was that the plain 
meaning of the statute protects transsexuals as transsexuals,200 and the second 
argument was that Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.201  
As to the first argument, the court held that Title VII “protection extends to 
transsexual employees only if they are discriminated against because they are male 
or because they are female.”202  In so holding, the court noted that “[s]cientific 
research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’ so that it 
extends beyond the two starkly defined categories of male and female.”203 Apart 
from the fact that there is scientific research recognizing that sex extends beyond the 
male-female binary,204 to the author fails to understand how or why science could 
change the “plain meaning” of the word “sex.”  Moreover, as has been previously 
stated, if courts give credence to the transsexual’s self-identification of his or her sex, 
then the issue will never be whether a transsexual plaintiff is a member of a protected 
class (since transsexuals identify themselves as either being male or female), but 
rather whether the employer terminated the plaintiff “because of sex.”   
This is not to say that the Etsitty approach is illogical.  To the contrary, it makes 
sense to narrowly interpret “discrimination because of sex” as meaning 
discrimination against men because they are men or women because they are 
women.  However, it also makes sense to broadly interpret “discrimination because 
of sex” as meaning discrimination against men because they are perceived as being 
women or discrimination against women because they are perceived as being men.  
Many courts have said that “Title VII is a remedial statute which should be liberally 
construed.”205  Therefore, there is no reason to interpret the word “sex” narrowly 
absent any indication that Congress intended otherwise when enacting the statute.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
If employment discrimination law is intended to protect people from 
discrimination based on immutable characteristics, then the law ought to protect 
transsexuals.  The best way to protect transsexuals from employment discrimination 
is through legislative means.  Legislation can protect a broad range of transgendered 
people, and the Legislature is better equipped than courts to resolve all the policy 
issues that may arise by granting transsexuals protection from employment 
discrimination. 
However, Title VII should also be interpreted as protecting transsexuals.  In the 
end, law is nothing more and nothing less than the government’s attempt to create 
rules and policies intended to curb behavior and realize justice through the use of 
words.  These words must be given their plain meaning unless otherwise defined.  
                                                                 
200 See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2007).  
201 See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222-24. 
202 Id. at 1222. 
203 Id. 
204 See, e.g., Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 213 n.5. 
205 See, e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1220. 
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Where, as in the case of Title VII, there is a statute that was intended to be construed 
liberally, and there is literally no legislative history from which one could conclude 
what Congress intended by using the word “sex,” there is no reason not to hold that 
Title VII protects transsexuals as transsexuals.  The sex stereotyping theory from 
Price Waterhouse, although presumably applicable to the element of causation in the 
case of a transsexual plaintiff, should not be applied to determine whether 
transsexuals are members of a protected class.  Rather, courts should operate on the 
premise that transsexuals are of the sex that they believe themselves to be, and then 
seek to determine whether they have been discriminated against because of sex. 
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